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Audio Watermarking Under Desynchronization
and Additive Noise Attacks
Abdellatif Zaidi, Student Member, IEEE, Rémy Boyer, Member, IEEE, and Pierre Duhamel, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Digital watermarking is often modeled as the trans-
mission of a message over a noisy channel denoted as “watermark
channel.” Distortions introduced by the watermark channel result
mainly from attacks and may include interference from the orig-
inal signal. One of the main differences with classical transmission
situations stems from the fact that perceived distortions have to
be taken into account. However, measuring the perceived impact
an attack has on a watermarked signal is currently an unsolved
problem. Possible means of circumventing this problem would be
1) to define the distortion in a so-called “perceived domain” and
define an “ad hoc” equivalence between objective and perceived
distortion or 2) to define an “equivalent distortion” by removing
from the attack noise the part that is correlated to the host signal.
This paper concentrates on the second approach and first shows
that the resulting “equivalent” attack is a particular case of a
thoroughly studied channel: filtering plus additive noise. However,
the approach in this paper emphasizes the fact that the additive
noise in the model has to be decorrelated with the signal. Then,
the formalism is applied to (desynchronization plus noise) attacks
on audio signals. In this context, this paper provides the corre-
sponding capacities, as well as optimal “attack” and “defense”
strategies in a game theory context.
Index Terms—Communication with side information, desyn-
chronization, dirty-paper coding, spread-spectrum (SS), water-
mark channel, watermarking game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL watermarking can be viewed as a communicationproblem. An information to be sent to the receiver is en-
coded into a signal called the watermark, which is then em-
bedded into the media signal , referred to as the cover signal,
to form the watermarked data .1 This watermarked data is sent
to the receiver through a channel, denoted as the watermark
channel, where it might be further processed or even replaced
by some other data. This process is also denoted as the attack.
In the context of robust watermarking, the goal of an attacker
is to impair or even remove the embedded watermark informa-
tion without impairing the cover signal. Conversely, the aim of
the defender2 is to design the transmitter in such a way that
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1In the rest of this paper, we will use interchangeably the set of terms host and
cover for the original signalx and also the set of terms composite, watermarked,
and public for the signal s.
2In this paper, the words “receiver” and “defender” are equivalently used to
refer to the watermark detector. The word “defender” is especially used in a
context of Game Theory, by opposition to that of an “attacker.”
the watermark is still there, as long as the attack results in re-
ceived signals of sufficient quality. This so-called robust water-
marking was first proposed for multimedia copyright protection
[1] and then for many other possible applications. Rather than
considering a given application, this paper is concerned with the
estimation of the channel parameters and the tuning of water-
marking systems so that the attacker and defender strategies are
optimized.
Robust digital watermarking differs from traditional commu-
nication in that the watermark should in general have the three
following contradicting requirements.
1) Imperceptibility: After embedding, the watermarked doc-
ument should remain perceptually equivalent to the orig-
inal signal . Usually, this is translated by the fact that the
embedding distortion should be upper bounded (dis-
regarding for a while that the perceived distortion is diffi-
cult to estimate).
2) Robustness: The watermark must be robust toward
common degradations. Depending on applications, these
degradations result from benign processing and transmis-
sion; in other cases, they result from deliberate attacks.
3) Capacity: The embedder should be able to transmit the
maximum amount of information through the watermark
channel. The amount of information a watermark carries
is called the payload. A rate of payload that is reliably
detectable and recoverable at the receiver side is called an
achievable rate. The data hiding capacity is the supremum
of all achievable rates.
Over the last years, several watermarking schemes have
been developed [2]–[4] for a large variety of data types.
These schemes can be broadly divided in two main classes:
1) host-interference nonrejecting methods and 2) host-inter-
ference rejecting methods. Host interference nonrejecting
methods do not allow the encoder to exploit knowledge of
the host signal . The simplest methods consist of adding a
pseudo-noise sequence to the host signal and are often referred
to as spread-spectrum (SS) (they can be either blind [5] or
nonblind [6]). When the knowledge of the host signal at the
encoder is adequately exploited in system design, the re-
sulting information embedding system can be host-interference
free. Examples include quantization index modulation (QIM)
[7], [8], dither modulation (DM) [9], [10], and the famous
scalar Costa scheme (SCS) [11]. In QIM-based watermarking
schemes, for example, decoding is achieved without any knowl-
edge of the original signal. We may view the design of QIM
systems as the simultaneous design of an ensemble of source
codes (quantizers) and channel codes (signal constellations).
For sufficiently large codebooks, blind recovery is possible
1053-587X/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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since the noise introduced by a quantizer is approximately
white and uncorrelated with the cover signal. Performances
of these watermarking schemes have been studied in terms of
capacity and robustness against different types of attacks. When
an attacker disrupts a watermark communication, it usually
results in two more or less correlated effects: 1) decreasing
detection reliability and 2) host signal quality degradation. The
relative strengths of these effects naturally depend on the attack
but also on the watermarking scheme itself.
A complete characterization of the watermark channel is not
available and seems to be very difficult in a general setting. Ini-
tially, the analysis of the watermark channel was limited to the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel where the at-
tack effect is assumed to be additive Gaussian noise-like. Re-
cently, however, theoretical analysis of more sophisticated wa-
termark channels have been published. In [12], Eggers et al.
proposed a channel model for digital watermarking facing at-
tacks by amplitude scaling and additive white noise (SAWN).
In [13], the authors focused on the reindexing channel, which
they showed to behave like a linear filter in average. The first
intent of this paper is to give means of appropriately charac-
terizing channel attacks in terms of distortion, with an attempt
to attenuate the discrepancy between the objective distortion
and the perceived one. Our main motivation is to use the pro-
posed approach to derive new insights into the desynchroniza-
tion plus noise attack, which will be modeled as an additive
white Gaussian noise and jitter (AWGN&J) channel. A desyn-
chronization attack can yield a very high probability of error
by simply resampling the received signal at other time instants.
Throughout this paper, the term “jitter” denotes an attack that
introduces random shifts in the nominal sampling instants.
The watermark channel of interest is first presented in Sec-
tion II. This channel is characterized as follows: 1) the attack
is shown to be equivalent to an amplitude scaling plus addi-
tive noise, uncorrelated to the signal, and 2) the distortion is
measured with respect to the watermarked signal and not to
the original signal as considered in [12] and [14] (Section III).
Given this channel characterization, the impact of the AWGN&J
channel is then evaluated in terms of capacity and error proba-
bility, in the case of SS and Costa-based watermarking schemes
(Section IV). The trend is put on imperfectly synchronized blind
SS-based watermarking. In Section V, the watermarking game
[15] is formulated and solved using the introduced objective and
perceived distortions when hiding SS sequences in audio sig-
nals. Solving the game sheds light on defender and attacker op-
timal strategies and provides answers to questions such as the
following.
• For a given (perceived) distortion budget, and from the
attacker point of view, what part should be allocated to
desynchronization, and what part should be allocated to
additive noise?
• From the defender point of view, what is the worst distor-
tion?
• Knowing that, is it possible to find countermeasures, so
that this distortion is reduced to a tolerable amount?
Notation: In the following, we use boldface font to indicate
vectors, e.g., . refers to the th sample of time-dependent
signal sampled at rate (i.e., ) and
to the th element of a vector . All vectors are row vec-
tors. Random variables are written in sans serif font, e.g., x for a
scalar random variable and x for a vector random variable. If is
an element of a vector space is its conjugate transpose and
is its normalized Euclidean norm. For two length- vec-
tors and denotes their normalized inner product,
i.e., . We write x to in-
dicate that a random variable x is distributed as . In this
case, x denotes its expectation. The Gaussian distribution
with mean and square deviation is denoted by .
Finally, if denotes all integers between
and .
II. WATERMARK CHANNEL AND ITS MODEL
A watermark channel refers to all operations a watermarked
signal may be subject to. These include intentional and nonin-
tentional manipulations. Initially, the watermarking system was
designed independently of the channel characterization, while
more recent works tune the system to be robust under the worst
possible attack in a given category. Thus, one difficulty is to
define tractable channel models that accurately fit the possible
impairments (either intentional or nonintentional).
The classical communication channels [Binary Symmetric
Channel (BSC), AWGN, Rayleigh, ] are not likely to accu-
rately model a watermark channel in real-world scenarios. A
better understanding of the watermark channel can be achieved
by considering attacks not through their nature but through
their impact on the watermarked signal: attacks on the cover
signal can in general be modeled easily by filtering plus addi-
tive noise. In a general setting, a straightforward model may
involve a signal-dependent noise. That is, the noise may be
highly correlated with the cover signal. This paper studies a
special case of this filtering plus noise channel and provides
some tools for increasing its usefulness (through the noise
decorrelation process). The proposed approach is then used
to focus on desynchronization attacks. Research to assess the
impact of desynchronization attacks in digital watermarking
has been carried out in two different directions:
1) some watermarking methods attempt to overcome desyn-
chronization attacks by embedding the watermark in an
“invariant domain” as in [16] and [17];
2) other schemes are based on an estimation of the attack
parameters followed by a compensation as in [18].
Recently, the AWGN&J channel was introduced by Baggen [19]
in the context of data storage applications to study the effect
of timing jitter in the capacity of magnetic recording media.
Insights from this model are used in this paper to investigate
the effect of desynchronization attacks on several watermarking
schemes.
A. A Distortion Model for a Watermark Attack
Let be the message to be transmitted. is usually first
encoded into a watermark and then embedded into the cover
signal . The resulting composite (watermarked) signal is
. Consider then a general attack over the watermark
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Fig. 1. Abstract communication model for blind (solid line) and nonblind (dashed) watermarking.
channel. In an attempt to fool the receiver, the attacker may use a
set of admissible attack parameters from some
finite domain . The attacker processes the signal in such a
way that the received signal is given by .
Equivalently, the received (attacked) signal can be written as
the sum of the watermarked signal and an interfering signal
. Of course, is -dependent, and it
fully characterizes the attack , i.e.,
(1)
Thus, the watermarking system can be modeled as depicted in
Fig. 1. The distortion resulting from the channel attack is gen-
erally measured by
r s z (2)
After the channel attack, the watermarked signal must remain
of sufficient quality. Thus, the channel attack
has to be upper bounded by a maximum distortion .
Clearly, “sufficient quality” should correspond to a perceived
distortion but is often measured by (2). This results in
z (3)
B. Outline of Our Approach
There are two problems with the classical channel descrip-
tion using the difference signal as given in Section II-A. First,
denoting this difference signal z as “noise” is not always ac-
curate: z may contain parts of the composite signal s. In such
a situation, z should not be treated as independent noise. Also,
“useful” components of z, i.e., those that are highly correlated to
the desired signal s must not be counted as noise and should be
considered as “useful.” Second, the distortion measure does
not perceptually characterize the attack effect on the water-
marked signal . To cope with these problems, one can note that
the attacker effect, that is the additional signal z, can be decom-
posed into two parts: one that is correlated to the desired signal
s and one that is not. The first part is somehow useful and should
be “included” in the desired signal s. The second being decor-
related with s can be reasonably considered as noise and will be
denoted as “attacker noise” hereafter. The overall approach is
equivalent to removing from the signal z the part that is corre-
lated to the watermarked signal and characterizing the attack
by the remaining part only, i.e., the attacker noise. One straight-
forward advantage is that the attacker-induced perceived distor-
tion is, likewise, readily measured by the energy (or power) of
the “noise” part. This decorrelation-based approach was used
previously to model quantization noise (when the high resolu-
tion assumption is not valid). More formally, our proposal is to
use a “scale plus additive noise” channel model and impose the
noise to be uncorrelated with the host signal, as follows:
under the constraint that (4)
Coefficient is easily obtained by imposing
, which gives
(5)
The residual noise is then given by
(6)
Note that, disregarding the value-metric scaling coefficient
, the resulting model (4) is additive—just like that given by
(1), . The main difference, however, consists of the
fact that unlike signal is uncorrelated with . In addi-
tion, by opposition to some recent watermarking-related works
where specific attacks are addressed as in [12], [15], and [20],
we proceed differently here: Given a general attack that pro-
cesses the signal s in such a way that the received signal is
, we begin writing this received signal as
. Next, we derive coefficient and signal according
to (5) and (6) such that the constraint in (4) is satisfied. As a re-
sult, the decorrelation process results in a model (4), apparently
common at first glance (i.e., of the form ). However,
important differences are 1) parameters and are not “ex-
plicit” in the channel attack, and 2) they depend on the trans-
mitted signal s itself. Another fundamental difference comes
from the fact that if ever the signal v involves a part that is corre-
lated to s, the communication model will remove it and include
it with composite signal s. The above model will be shown to
be particularly useful with desynchronization attacks. Note also
that the subscript in and is used to point out the model
parameters’ dependency on the attack , as clearly shown by (5)
and (6). For convenience, we will simply use and to char-
acterize the channel attack every time no ambiguity is possible.
C. Objective and Perceived Distortion Measure
A very simple computation allows the computation of the
“error signal” variance in terms of the “noise signal” variance,
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Fig. 2. Additive white Gaussian noise and jitter channel.
which in most circumstances is much smaller. Due to decorre-
lation between s and n, the objective distortion defined by (2)
becomes
(7)
Thus, the communication model (4) shows a scale factor (a
luminance change for images, a sound level change for audio
signals) and an additive noise n. Both the scaling and the noise
inhibit reliable detection of the watermark at the receiver side.
However, only the noise n should be considered in evaluating
host signal quality loss. Consequently, we assume in this paper
that, for perceived distortion measure, the scale factor does not
contribute to the distortion. Hence, rather than assuming that
the MSE (the norm of the error signal) is a good model for
the perceived distortion, we shall devote this role to . Obvi-
ously, more accurate models exist, involving human perception
models, but the model (4) seems to be a good tradeoff between
accuracy and tractability. Simulation results based on real audio
signals in the presence of desynchronization attacks show its ac-
curacy.
III. AWGN&J CHANNEL CLASSICAL MODEL
In this section, after a short presentation of the AWGN&J
channel, AWGN&J desynchronization effects are investigated
differently: 1) using common intersymbol interference (ISI) as-
sumptions commonly known the communication theory in Sec-
tion III-A and 2) using the model (4) in Section III-B. Both ap-
proaches are finally compared. In other words, we will compare
the distortions resulting from the two writings of the jittered
signal.3 This comparison will confirm the accuracy of the model
(4) and emphasize its particular usefulness for desynchroniza-
tion attacks characterization.
The AWGN&J channel is an AWGN channel in which the
signal s is, in addition to the independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gaussian noise v, randomly sampled, as shown in Fig. 2.
More precisely, the receiver has to decide on the presence of the
watermark based on rather
than . The delay can be larger than
one sampling period . However, in most cases, the receiver
can compensate for any time shifts multiple of with relatively
easy resynchronization procedures. A very easy method will be
described in Subsection V-A. In the following, we assume that
is a fraction of the sampling period , i.e., .
3Note that a plain comparison consists in comparing the distortions resulting
from writing the received signal as 1) r = s + v and 2) r = ks + n + v,
which amounts to comparing s to r = ks + n.
The deviation is a realization of the process J at time and
J is assumed to be Gaussian, J . Depending on the
desynchronization (constant shift or random sampling), can
either be random or constant. Both cases are addressed hereafter.
The resulting watermarking communication over an AWGN&J
channel is similar to that described in Section II except that,
this time, the watermarked signal is replaced by such that
. The jittered signal will be denoted by in case
of a constant scaling and by in case of random sampling.
Some studies of desynchronization attacks using the
AWGN&J channel model [21]–[23] or not [14] already
exist. However, in these works, the desynchronization noise is
expressed using the ISI term and is assumed to be uncorrelated
with the watermarked signal. This assumption, while valid in a
traditional communication context, cannot hold in the context
of watermarking due to the correlation of signals. Instead, this
ISI term must first be processed to remove from it the part
that is correlated to the watermarked signal s. Only after that,
the remaining part can be assumed to be noise-like. This is a
straightforward application of the model (4) above. Using this
model will shed light on AWGN&J desynchronization and will
prove the inaccuracy of the classical ISI approach. The latter is
stated in the following subsection.
A. ISI Approach to AWGN&J Channel Desynchronization
Under appropriate band-limited assumptions, the time-con-
tinuous signal can be reconstructed without error from the
sequence according to Shannon–Nyquist interpola-
tion, as follows:
(8)
This expression will be used to derive expressions for desyn-
chronization noise and induced distortions in presence of a jitter.
Whenever required, indexes and will refer, respectively, to
fixed and random jitters. Equation (8) can be put in the form
(9)
This equation shows that introducing a constant time shift is
equivalent to filtering the watermarked signal or, alternatively,
to first attenuating the watermarked signal and then adding
a signal-dependent noise given by
(10)
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Fig. 3. Effect of a constant time scaling  = T is investigated differently i)
as an additional noise of power  resulting from the ISI term (diamond) as
considered in [14] and ii) using the proposed model (asterisk). Corresponding
scale factors and desynchronization noises are compared. (a) Diagram of
dependency of the scale factor k on the deviation  with respect to sinc().
(b) Equivalent white noise power  with respect to  stemming from the
plain model. Results are obtained with document-to-watermark ratio (DWR)
= 20 dB.
The signal can be seen in the context of digital communi-
cation as the ISI term. Moreover, in case of a constant shifting,
the scaling does not change the overall energy of the signal .
Thus, under the uncorrelation hypothesis assumed in [14] and
using (9), the distortion due to adding the signal writes
(11)
In the case of random resampling, the variable is random. The
corresponding distortion can be expressed as in (11) with an ad-
ditional expectation over all possible values of . A much sim-
pler alternative expression of can be obtained by using the
Fig. 4. Diagram of dependency of the desynchronization noise  on the
jitter square deviation J . Dependency on the composite signal s = x + w is
illustrated through that on the document-to-watermark ratio (DWR): the jitter
becomes stronger with strong watermarks (lower DWRs).
Taylor–Young series expansion around . At first order,
. The effect of the jitter can then be viewed
as the introduction of an additional signal given by
(12)
Clearly, the signal depends on the watermarked signal
. The corresponding distortion is given by
(13)
Note that ISI signals and rise directly from interpolation
in case of constant shift and random resampling, respectively.
Hence, a priori, these terms are not necessarily decorrelated
from . An additional decorrelation process (as described in the
model (4)) is needed to extract the corresponding noise parts.4
However, in this subsection, we forget for a while the correla-
tion with and derive insights into the AWGN&J channel using
conventional ISI assumptions.5 In this case, based on (11) and
(13), one can already give some specificities of watermarking
channels including jitter.
1) The influence of the jitter depends on the watermarked
signal power . Hence, the well-known em-
bedder strategy consisting of increasing the watermark
power to improve detector performance in case of
AWGN attacks is no longer the optimum strategy, since
at the same time, it enforces the impact of the desyn-
chronization attack by increasing the attack distortion (see
Fig. 4).
4These noise parts given by model (4) will be denoted by n and n , respec-
tively. Fig. 3(b) shows that    . Therefore, the signal z contains parts
of s that have to be removed from it in order to get the noise part (i.e., n ). Note
also that simulation results with real audio signals support the fact that z and
s are highly correlated.
5That is, the ISI term is uncorrelated with the signal s(t) being interpolated.
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2) Since the jitter noise is somehow proportional to the orig-
inal signal, embedding the watermark into a transform do-
main where the original data is less powerful may alleviate
the effect of the jitter.
In the following section, the AWGN&J channel is characterized
using the model (4). The goal is, as stated before, to compare
the resulting distortions to those being derived using the ISI ap-
proach and given by (11) and (13).
B. AWGN&J Channel in Light of Model (4)
Expressing differently the jittered signal , 1) using the
model (4) and 2) using (9), we get . Constant and
random time shifts are treated separately.
1) Constant Time Shift: As mentioned before, the scaling
does not change the overall energy of the signal in case of
a constant time shift. This can be shown to result in
and . In addition, using the model (4), it fol-
lows that
(14a)
(14b)
Fig. 3(a) depicts the dependency of the equivalent scale factor
on the sampling deviation . It can be seen that decreases
with but has a much smaller dependency on than the
factor corresponding to the ISI approach. Note that
curves in Fig. 3(a) correspond to a document-to-watermark ratio
DWR of 20 dB and a watermark-to-noise
ratio WNR of 0 dB, which are typical
values in watermarking systems. Smaller values of can be
obtained with stronger watermarked signals. It is worth noting
that the model parameter given by (14a) is larger than the
scale factor of expression (9) obtained with the ISI
approach. In order to further outline the accuracy of the model
(4), we compare the power of the noise to that of the
ISI term . The result is depicted in Fig. 3(b). We see that
naturally increases with the shift . However, unlike the scale
factor, is smaller than . As stated before, writing the
jittered signal as the sum of two signals, one that is propor-
tional (highly correlated) to it and another that is decorrelated
from it, permits the extraction of the noise part . Since is
smaller than and is the power of the exact noise term in
, it follows that should not be totally accounted to noise.
The difference corresponds to the power of the part
of that is falsely attributed to noise in the ISI approach.
2) Random Time Shift: Consider now the random jitter case.
Again, we have
(15)
with uncorrelated with . Parameters and can be de-
rived in a way similar to the constant shift case. Intuitively, how-
ever, unlike a constant shift, the random variable in en-
sures enough randomness this time so that the objective error
may be reasonably considered as uncorrelated with the water-
marked signal (this is checked below by simulation; see
Fig. 4). can hence be assimilated to a signal-dependent
noise that is approximately decorrelated from . Therefore, it
follows that
(16a)
(16b)
Desynchronization experiments, including real audio signals
sampled at 44.1 kHz show that is most of the time very
close to unity and that for a jitter square deviation , we
have . In addition, these tests show that the embedded
watermark is inaudible as long as . Of course, this
threshold depends on the signal used and should not be taken
for granted, but it already gives an idea about the jitter square
deviation range of interest. For this range, simulations show that
. The uncorrelation assumption is, unlike the con-
stant time shift, approximately valid for practically all relevant
jitter attacks. The jitter acts then as an additive noise of power
. However, this noise is dependent on the composite
signal . Fig. 4 illustrates this dependency: here, the
cover signal power is maintained fixed. That of the wa-
termark varies according to DWR
10, 15, 25, 30 dB. Also, the additive Gaussian noise power
is fixed. We see that 1) the effect of the jitter
(strength of desynchronization noise ) increases with the jitter
square deviation (the dependency is approximately linear),
and 2) as the power increases (DWR decreases), the jitter be-
comes stronger. This illustrates the remark above: increasing the
watermark power for more reliable detection in an AWGN&J
channel enforces at the same time the effect of the jitter.
In light of the stated above comparison, we conclude the fol-
lowing.
1) The decorrelation hypothesis between and is in gen-
eral not consistent. The ISI term is highly correlated to
.
2) Removing from the ISI term the signal-like term results
in a more accurate characterization of the attack where
the real scale factor is larger than and the real
equivalent additive noise is much weaker than the ISI
term .
3) The objective distortion induced by the scaling attack is
(17)
The perceived distortion is given by , which is much
smaller than that rising directly from the plain model.
4) The random jitter has additive signal-dependent-like be-
havior.
The AWGN&J channel has been characterized in terms of jitter-
induced distortions. Since the capacity of any watermarking
scheme depends mainly on these distortions,6 one important
thing is to evaluate the performances of this scheme over an
AWGN&J channel. The distortions expressed above will help
estimate the real performances loss. To that end, two water-
marking schemes taken, respectively, from the interference-re-
jecting and nonrejecting watermarking methods are considered.
6It also depends on the embedding distortion D =  . In addition, for
blind SS embedding, the host signal itself accounts for self-noise and must be
included in the channel distortion as shown by (24a).
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Fig. 5. Blind watermarking as writing on dirty paper over channel (4).
For the former, a brief overview of communication with state
information at the encoder is given.
IV. OPTIMAL AND SUBOPTIMAL WATERMARKING
SCHEMES FACING AWGN&J ATTACKS
We assume watermarking of an i.i.d. Gaussian original signal
x over a watermark channel characterized by its at-
tack such that . Such a channel may represent the
traditional AWGN channel, the SAWGN channel investigated
in [12], or the AWGN&J depicted above or any other water-
marking channel (attack). Only the pair would vary ac-
cordingly. The receiver compensates for the scaling by dividing
by to produce the preprocessed signal
(18)
Thus, the watermark receiver sees an additive white noise
(AWN) channel with the effective noise , with vari-
ance . The watermark capacity for communicating over
this effective channel depends only on the cover signal and
the ratio of the embedding distortion
by the effective channel noise . The noise power is
related to by (7) which enables the computation of the ratio
as
(19)
A. Ideal Costa Scheme
Rather than considering watermarking as communication
over a very noisy channel where the host signal acts as
self-interference (as in SS), it has recently been realized [24],
[25] that blind watermarking can be viewed as communication
with side information at the encoder. The relevant work is the
initial Costa “Writing on Dirty Papers” [26]. Fig. 5 depicts a
block diagram of blind watermark communication over the
channel (4) where the encoder exploits the side-information
about the host signal. The scheme originally conceived by
Costa is called the Ideal Costa Scheme (ICS) and emerges
as a universally good encoding strategy for coding with side
information available at the encoder. Based on a huge random
codebook, Costa showed that optimal transmitter encodes its
message “in the direction” of the interfering signal such that
the latter does not affect the capacity of the channel, achieving
thus the standard Gaussian channel capacity. In our case, the
effective watermark-to-noise power ratio is given
by (19). Hence, the communication rate under an attack of the
form (4) writes
(20)
For given , and , capacity is defined as the supremum
of all achievable rates. Alternatively, Moulin et al. showed in
[27] that the hiding capacity may be formulated as a min–max
problem between the information hider and the attacker.
The information hider wants a guaranteed rate of reliable
transmission under any attack that satisfies a upper-bound
constraint on . Conversely, the attacker wants to minimize
this rate for any information hiding strategy that satisfies an
upper-bound constraint on the embedding distortion . Later,
in [28], Moulin et al., with a differently defined distortion
measure, have shown that the optimum attack over all possible
attacks is a specific scale plus additive white Gaussian noise
(SAWGN). For the channel (4) investigated here, capacity is
then obtained by minimizing (20) over all possible attacks
. The
constraint on admissible scale factor set corresponds to the
expression inside the function in (20) strictly larger than
unity. Otherwise, capacity would be negative and the water-
marking system design meaningless. Details of the resolution
are skipped here since a very similar game, where the objective
function is the detection probability, will be thoroughly studied
in Section V. The resolution gives
and
(21)
Note that in general such that
is well satisfied. In
addition, the term on the right-hand side of (21) is the achievable
capacity if there were no attack (which is that of an AWGN
channel with SNR ).
B. Traditional Spread-Spectrum
A simplified diagram of basic SS-based watermarking over
the channel (4) is shown in Fig. 6. Blind and nonblind reception
refer to the fact of having access or not to the cover signal at
the receiver side. If yes, the decoder subtracts the cover signal
from the received signal prior to decoding. If not, the decoder
performance suffers greatly from host-signal interference. Blind
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Fig. 6. Blind (solid line) and nonblind (dashed line) SS-based watermarking over channel (4).
and nonblind communication rates under an attack of the form
(4) write
(22a)
(22b)
Again, capacity is obtained through a min–max problem reso-
lution. The set of admissible scale factors for the nonblind case
is the same as before. For blind SS, it is given by (23), shown
at the bottom of the page. The optimization results in the same
saddle-point as before, which satisfies (23)
and for which transmission rates write
(24a)
(24b)
Capacity loss of both ICS and SS is depicted in Fig. 7. As
shown by (21) and (24a), the attack (4) results in significant ca-
pacity loss especially for very low WNRs . As for the
AWGN channel, ICS outperforms SS for almost all values of
. Note, however, that ICS-capacity reduction is larger
than that for SS: ICS is less robust than SS facing attacks of
the form (4). This fact will be supported by simulations over an
AWGN&J channel [see Fig. 8(a) and (b)]. Also, in case of very
strong attacks, ICS and SS capacities fall to the same values
and ICS presents no gain over SS. These attacks are, however,
sufficiently strong to practically impair any communication and
are, consequently, not relevant in real applications. For reason-
able WNRs ( 16 dB), ICS remains more
efficient.
Fig. 7. Capacity loss of both ICS and blind SS scheme under the influence of an
attack of the form (4). The result is depicted for DWR = 10 log ( =D ) =
20 dB. For strong attacks, ICS and SS capacities fall to same values. ICS
becomes more sensitive than SS.
Now, focus on the special case of an AWGN&J channel.
This channel has been shown to be a special case of attacks of
the form (4), with parameters and given by (14a), (14b),
(16a), and (16b). Hence, ICS and blind SS capacities over an
AWGN&J channel are readily given by (21) and (24a), respec-
tively, and are shown in Fig. 7. However, since these capacities
are obtained through a min–max resolution, they correspond
to the achievable rate under the optimum attack . More
insights can be obtained using achievable rates (20) and (22a)
instead of capacities as stated below.
C. Application to AWGN&J Channels
Here, unlike capacity that is derived analytically using
, we want to see how transmission rates and
(23)
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Fig. 8. Transmission rate loss of both ICS (solid line) and blind SS (dashed
line) over an AWGN&J channel. Gaussian noise v is such that  = 10  .
(a) Composite signal s is scaled with  = T . (b) s is randomly resampled
using the jitter J  N (0; J). With both schemes and under both attacks,
transmission rate degrade with DWR. From bottom to top: DWR = 25, 20,
and 15 dB.
degrade in presence of a jitter J. That is, we are
interested in the current jitter being used and not the optimal
one as in capacity analysis. Simulations are required to com-
pute parameter and noise in (20) and (22a). We proceed as
follows: Given some jitter (shift ), the composite signal is
interpolated resulting in . Next, the equivalent attack (scaling
and noise ) is derived, and white Gaussian noise is added.
The received signal is , where is the
overall channel noise.
1) Rate Loss Under Constant Time Shift Attacks: Fig. 8(a)
depicts transmission rates given by (20) and (22a) using ex-
pressions given by (14a) and (14b) for the scale factor and
the noise . For both ICS and SS, these are shown for three
values of DWR . We observe that the ICS
transmission rate drastically decreases if the sampling devia-
tion increases. This illustrates the loss in ICS capacity al-
ready shown in Fig. 7 and particularly apparent for low WNR
: As is close to unity, the jitter-induced dis-
tortion is large and WNR is low. It is worth noting that
IC- rate degradation reveals a more general setting: Almost all
quantization-based embedding schemes are highly sensitive to
scaling. When scaled, the received signal is rounded to a bad
quantization cell center. Blind SS, however, is almost insensitive
to scaling but performs far below ICS. This is particularly useful
for the design of watermarking systems in situations the trans-
mitted signal may be scaled in the channel: ICS should be pre-
ferred to SS for applications where a great amount of informa-
tion is to be transmitted. However, SS may be used for applica-
tions where the transmission rate is not the main issue and where
robustness against scaling is highly appreciated. The latter ap-
plications are referred to as “one-bit watermarking” problems
in digital watermarking. Another important remark rises from
comparing the transmission rates corresponding to the same
shift but different values of DWR. It can be seen that the higher
the DWR, the larger the rate loss. This is not contradictory with
(11) because the embedding distortion is reduced as well so
that the transmission rate broadly decreases for large DWR.7
2) Rate Loss Under Random Jitter Attacks: The effect of a
random jitter J combined with an AWGN attack
on a watermarked signal is depicted in Fig. 8(b). For
the same reason as above, we concentrate on attacks with jitter
square deviation . Again, we use (20) and (22a), where
and are replaced by (16a) and (16b), respectively. As for
the constant time shift case, we observe that ICS-rate reduction
is larger than that of SS, which is almost insensitive to the jitter.
Also, though large DWRs result in small distortions as previ-
ously shown by (13), the decrease in the embedding distortion
causes the transmission rate to degrade.
Now compare the ICS-rate loss to that in case of a constant
shift attack. It is worth noting that the rate loss is larger when
facing constant shifting. This is not completely surprising: Re-
member that the random jitter attack has been shown to behave
as additive noise. With ICS, whose practical implementations
are forms of quantization, scaling is more harmful than adding
noise. This fact will be supported by the game theory resolu-
tion in Section V. The remainder of the paper is devoted to pro-
viding insights into both the optimum attack and the optimum
defense. By “optimum,” it is meant the “the best strategy” in
a game theory context. The Watermarking Game does not have
universal solutions, and both attacker and defender should adapt
to each other. Here, the game is first briefly reviewed and then
solved in the case of an AWGN&J attack and blind SS. We also
provide a simple means of circumventing constant time shift at-
tacks.
V. GAME THEORY APPROACH TO AWGN&J CHANNELS
In a robust watermarking transmission context, the embedder
must design his embedding scheme so that the watermark sur-
vives the worst possible attack. Conversely, the attacker has to
perform the optimal attack that best impairs the watermark, for
7Note that small increasing of the DWR is obtained through decreasing the
embedding distortion D =  . Cover signal and Gaussian noise powers 
and  are maintained fixed as above.
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a given distortion budget. The resulting optimization problem
(game theory problem) is often formulated as a max–min (or
min–max) problem. The criterion to be optimized is the detec-
tion (or, equivalently, error) probability in case of one-bit water-
marking and the watermarking capacity in case of data hiding.
Since capacity has already been optimized in Section IV and
since for many watermarking applications, the most significant
criterion is reliable detection, we concentrate on the one-bit wa-
termarking. We consider the criterion of detection probability.
The game watermarking has been thoroughly studied in the case
of an AWGN channel [20], [29], [30]. In [15], Moulin et al.
discussed the case of attacks by filtering and additive noise. In
[12], Eggers et al. considered attacks by amplitude scaling and
additive noise. But, by opposition to the following, only objec-
tive distortions were used and were evaluated with respect to the
original host signal, not to the watermarked signal.
In an AWGN&J channel, the attacker can desynchronize the
signal and add noise as well. In this section, we answer the fol-
lowing three questions.
1) If ever the attacker has a perceived distortion budget, with
two ways of using it—either by introducing jitter or by
using additive noise or any combination of both—what is
the best strategy?
2) Conversely, what is the best tuning for the defender
knowing the best potential attack?
3) Is there means for the defender to find countermeasures to
the attacker strategy (put some limits to the efficiency of
its optimal strategy)?
We begin by answering 3). The main difficulty in synchronizing
a randomly scaled received signal stems, as stated above, from
the fact that random time scaling the watermarked signal
broadly behaves like adding noise (disregarding that this noise
is signal-dependent as given by (12)). In case of a constant
time shift, however, the receiver should be able to reverse the
effect of scaling. The main solutions that have been proposed
can be divided into two categories: 1) embedding of a pilot
sequence as classically used in traditional communication and
2) using a correlation-based alignment algorithm [31]. While
pilot sequences present an additional source of weakness if
ever intercepted by an attacker, the algorithm in [31] has good
matching properties but requires the availability of (a copy of)
the original signal at the receiver side.8 This algorithm consists
of computing the maximum normalized correlation between
the pirated (attacked) signal and the original. Here, we propose
a cross-correlation-based matching process that we denote by
“multiple correlation test.” This procedure is similar to that in
[31] but does not require knowledge of the original content at
the receiver. Blind resynchronization is made possible by using
the watermark instead of the original signal for correlation
computation. Having access to the watermark at the receiver
side is commonly assumed in a one-bit watermarking context.
The aim is to mark user-specific contents with the same small
watermark.
8In [31], Schonberg et al. proposed this algorithm in the context of finger-
printing, which is indeed an application where availability of the original signal
is usually assumed. Here, we focus on detecting the same watermark embedded
in several different contents.
A. Preventing Constant Shift
Suppose the attacker performs, in addition to the AWGN ,
a time shift with . The restriction
is due to the fact that, with a cross-correlation-based resynchro-
nization procedure, the defender can compensate for any -mul-
tiple time shift: The receiver searches for the maximum cross
correlation between the received (attacked) signal and the wa-
termark and realigns before proceeding to detection so that
he or she gets rid of any -multiple scaling. We concentrate
then on the case . As stated above, the received wa-
termarked (and attacked) signal is given by
, where and are, respectively,
desynchronized signals and . The analysis below
shows that desynchronization is much more harmful than white
noise. Therefore, it is very important for the defender to main-
tain this contribution to a reasonable level. One possible way is
to interpolate the received signal, so that the receiver performs
several shifts of the watermark along the time axis, and
proceed to correlation tests with for each of these shifted ver-
sions. Depending on the number of correlation tests the decoder
can perform, the receiver can maintain the maximum time shift
to a desired bounded value. A large number of tests at the re-
ceiver side, however, increases the computational complexity.
Therefore, there will be a tradeoff between computational com-
plexity and optimality. Suppose the receiver is able to perform
tests. Let denote the watermark signal shifted by
, that is
and , the correlation coef-
ficient between the received signal and , with
. In order to bound within an interval
of length , the receiver determines ac-
cording to
(25)
represents the location index for which optimally
matches the signal when scaled back by . Next,
the receiver proceeds to detection using the aligned signal
. Likewise, the residual desynchronization is
smaller than , and the attacker should not waste energy
in further desynchronizing the watermarked signal . The
cost the receiver has to pay in order to maintain the maximum
time shift to a (small) bounded value is the computation of
correlations. From the analysis outlined in the first part
of the paper, this bounding (a parameter of the transmitter)
is absolutely required; otherwise, desynchronization-induced
noise would increase to very large values, resulting in very poor
detection performances.
B. Game Theoretical Formulation
We consider the embedding of one bit of information
into an original data of length , assumed to
be Gaussian, x . The watermark signal is given
by —where chips are mutually independent with
respect to x. The sequence u is produced by a pseudorandom
number generator (PRN) using a secret key K . Its ele-
ments are equal to or (see Fig. 6). Also, according to
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Kerkhoff’s principle, we suppose the attacker knows the used
watermarking scheme. The embedder, however, not having
access to the attacker scale factor , does not normalize the re-
ceived signal. In this context, the attacker may either add white
Gaussian noise, desynchronize the watermarked signal, or
perform both operations as long as the overall attack distortion
is upper-bounded by a certain tolerance level . On
the other side, the embedder chooses the appropriate length
of original data, the number of correlations to be performed,
and watermark power subject to a certain maximum em-
bedding distortion .
1) Detection Probability: Detection is based on the sign of
where the received signal is and
, with
Therefore, the probability density function (PDF) of is given
by . Natural perfor-
mances measure for the one-bit watermarking problem are
probability of false positive (false alarm) , false negative
(miss detection) and probability of detection . The
watermark detection problem can be formulated as a hypothesis
test:
The detector decides that a watermark is present if , where
is some detection threshold that controls the trade-off between
false positive and false negative decisions. These probabilities
are given by
(26a)
(26b)
(26c)
The parameter is unknown. Noncoherent detection theory
provides several techniques to solve detection problems with
unknown parameters. Below the Neyman–Pearson approach is
first reviewed and then applied to derive consistent choice of
parameter . More details about such choice can be found in
[32].
2) Neyman–Pearson Criterion for Threshold Selec-
tion: Subject to a constraint on the maximum acceptable
probability of false positive (false alarm), the test consists of
minimizing the probability of false negative (miss-detection).
For example, a maximum allowable probability of false alarm
leads to a threshold . In [6], it is
stated that to improve the characteristics of robustness against
attacks, the new threshold should be evaluated directly on the
watermarked and possibly attacked signal . This results in the
following choice:
for a constant shift
for a random shift
3) Max–Min Criterion: Over an AWGN&J channel, the de-
tection probability, denoted by , is given by (26c).
Also, we assume as stated in [14], that meaningful embedding
and attack distortions should satisfy
(27)
Taking into account the defender ability to perform the mul-
tiple correlation test described above, the scaling must satisfy
. Due to correlation computing cost, we suppose
is a parameter of the defender. For the same reason
(correlation based detection cost), very large values of the signal
length are not allowed . As for the bound on ,
that on should ensure good compromise between detection
performance and computing complexity. The embedder wants
to maximize , and the attacker wants to minimize it
under constraints pair . The problem is then
naturally formulated as a game between the embedder and the
attacker and can be written as
(28)
This optimization problem is solved in the following section for
both constant and random scalings.
C. Solving the Watermarking Game
The attack distortion has been shown above to be given by
. Let us first determine the part of the
distortion budget that the attacker should allocate to noise and
that to allocate to jitter, so that the detection performances are
maximally reduced. By considering the proposed model
in which and are uncorrelated as required by model
(4), there is a priori no difference in nature between and
(disregarding dependency on the signal ). Hence, we divide
the global attack distortion into two parts: due to scaling
and due to the additive noise such that
(29a)
(29b)
characterizes the tradeoff between the two compo-
nents of the global distortion. We will refer to the case
as the all-noise case since the overall attack is equivalent to that
of adding the noise quantity . Similarly, we will refer to
the case as the all-desynchronization case since it corre-
sponds to a channel attack by time-axis scaling only. Any other
attack with will be termed as mixed since both adding
noise and scaling are required.
1) Case of a Constant Time Shift Attack: Prior to revealing
optimum attacker and defender strategies, we suppose the
proper resynchronization procedure investigated above was
used and reformulate the optimization problem. The multiple
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correlation test does not change the criterion to be optimized.
However, the ranges of the optimization variables and
are modified (as it will be shown in (33)). Intuitively, this
follows from the fact that countermeasurements performed by
the defender naturally reduce the set of admissible parameters
for the attacker. In our case, a lower bound on can be shown
to result in a lower bound on the attack scale factor : Let
be the function relating to . For an explicit expression of
, we need to combine (14a) and (10). Namely, we
need to invert (10) to get and replace it in (14a). Unfortu-
nately, no explicit formula for parameter can be derived from
(10). However, parameter dependence on is depicted in
Fig. 3(a). Using this curve will be shown to be sufficient to
bypass the difficulty raised above.9 Of course, this results in
an approximate solution, but it is already enough to answer
questions raised while formulating the game. Also, the curve
depicted in Fig. 3(a) corresponds to specific values of WNR
0 dB and DWR 20 dB, but this would not change the con-
cluding remarks related to relative noise and desynchronization
effects and stated at the end of this section. In other words,
not knowing the watermark power does not matter since
we only use the monotonously decreasing property of in
solving the game. This property implies a lower bound on the
set of admissible values for the scale factor . The constraint
gives in . There exists then a lower
bound on , say such that and
. Using (29b), we obtain
(30)
Similarly, lower bound constraint on implies a sim-
ilar constraint on : There exists such that
, which when combined with (30), gives
(31)
Furthermore, inequality gives
. The latter upper bound on can be understood this
way: A part of the overall distortion must be allocated to
noise. It is worth noting that scenarios corresponding to
and are worthy of some discussion.
1) : With respect to cases (all desyn-
chronization) and (all noise), this case corre-
sponds to a mixed situation where the attacker should
both add noise and desynchronize the signal. The global
objective distortion results then from both i) an at-
tack by amplitude scaling causing an objective distortion
and ii) an attack by additive noise
of power . With regard to these
distortions, one can note the following:
a) increasing the watermarked signal power enforces
the distortion due to the scale factor with respect
to that of the equivalent noise ;
b) increasing the admissible set of correlations causes
the distortion to decrease; conversely, the additive
noise distortion increases.
9It will be shown that for the final solution, we need just bounds on the value-
metric scaling parameter k. These can already be obtained from Fig. 3(a).
Imposing a lower bound on gives
and prevents the receiver from the all-desynchronization
attack. However, this is achieved by the cost of a certain
signal processing complexity at the receiver side implic-
itly shown here through the defender parameter .
2) : This is the case of an attenuating additive noise .
The attack is of type AWGN and traditional watermarking
game solutions apply. Most prominent examples of these
can be found in [15] and [20].
We now rewrite the detection probability (26c) with and
expressed by (30) and (29a), respectively. The resulting
formula can be expressed as a function of both the setting of de-
fender parameters and that of the attacker ,
as
(32)
where . Note that depends on
through the admissible set values of parameter . Consequently,
the max–min problem (28) specializes as
(33)
where
We now turn to the attacker and defender optimum strategies.
a) Optimum Attack: For a given set of defender
parameters , the detection probability
writes as a function of the attacker
parameters pair . A two-dimensional (2-D) plot of
this function is shown in Fig. 9(a). We see that the detection
probability decreases with . The optimal attack corresponds,
as intuitively expected, to a maximized global distortion
. Minimizing then over for
given values of , and provides the optimal scaling
attack. Fig. 9(b) clearly shows that the detection probability is
maximally reduced for : This corresponds to a mixed
attack and refers to the fact that desynchronization is much
more efficient than noise in impairing the detection probability
for a given distortion budget. Note that without the multiple
correlation procedure, the optimal solution would be ,
that is the so denoted all-desynchronization.
In summary: when given the possibilities of adding white
noise, desynchronizing the watermarked signal by constant
scaling or performing both operations, desynchronization turns
out to be optimal. However, to cope with appropriate defender
countermeasurements (the multiple correlation test described
above), the attacker is constrained to a maximum allowable
attack distortion budget . Thus, its best strategy is first to
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Fig. 9. Optimum attack: Detection probability has to be minimized over the
set of attacker parameters f;D g. The 2-D plot (top) shows that maximally
reduced detection is obtained with large attack distortion D = D .
The corresponding detection probability P (D = D ) plotted over
 2 [ ; 1] (bottom) shows that the optimal attack is mixed,  =  .
desynchronize the signal and then fulfill the remainder of the
distortion budget by adding the appropriate noise amount.
As a result, the received signal corresponding to the worst
attack can be expressed as
(34)
where is such that .
Recall that in real-world scenarios, the attacker chooses the
parameters and (not and ). The optimal attack turns to
correspond to the combination of the following single attacks:
• a time shift ;
• an additive noise of power , where
.
b) Optimized Defense: We now turn to characterize the
optimized defense that best prevents the defender from the worst
attack . After replacing attacker parameters by cor-
responding optimum values derived above, the detection prob-
ability (32), depending only on , and , writes
(35)
The aim of the defender is to maximize this worst detec-
tion probability (35). With qualitative considerations, we can
already determine the optimum value of : The detection
probability depends on through . Larger values of ,
corresponding to a tight range of , are better for the defender.
Then, disregarding computational complexity, should be
maximized. An optimum defender choice would then intu-
itively correspond to . The resulting depicted in
Fig. 10(a) shows that the watermark embedding power should
be maximized, namely . Also, the parameter
should have the largest possible value, i.e., .
Hence, the optimum defense corresponds to the set of defender
parameters chosen to be maximal (
and ). This is not surprising and is rather
consolidating. One important issue, however, is to compare
the robustness of the optimized defense against the mixed
attack (shown to be optimal) to that facing the all-noise attack.
Fig. 10(b) depicts the detection probability (35) for different
values of the watermark power . We observe the following.
• For the same watermark power , we have
, (the mixed attack is stronger than
the all-noise attack). In other words, to achieve the same
detection probability, the embedding distortion of a wa-
termark facing the mixed attack must be larger than that
of a watermark facing the all-noise attack.
• The slope of the detection probability curve in case of the
all-noise attack is larger than that of the mixed attack: A
part of the watermark power enforces the attack impact
in the latter case. This fact has already been outlined in
Subsection III-A with a nonoptimized defense. Unfortu-
nately, it remains valid with an optimized defense as well.
2) Case of Random Jitter: This attack has been shown to be
equivalent to an additive noise . Again, suppose
and . The resulting
detection probability is
(36)
with . The threshold de-
pends only on the global attack distortion . This would sug-
gest that, from a strict theoretical game-solving point of view,
the situation is equivalent to that of the Gaussian watermarking
game [20] (under the hypothesis of a Gaussian jitter noise ).
One can see, however, that from the defender point of view
fighting against a random jitter attack is more difficult than that
of facing a Gaussian noise. At least, the perceived quality degra-
dation will be greater with the jitter. This means that jittering the
watermarked signal would remain optimal from the attacker’s
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Fig. 10. Optimum defense: Detection probability has to be maximized over
the set of defender parameters fN;D g. The 2-D plot (top) shows that reliable
detection is obtained with large embedding distortion D = D and
N = N . Bottom: The detection probability resulting from solving the
game (mixed attack) is compared to that of the all-noise attack. For the same
embedding distortion, Pd( =  ) is smaller than Pd( = 1).
point of view. This claim is enforced by the fact that, unlike
the Gaussian noise , the jitter noise depends on the wa-
termarked signal (as suggested by (13)) and is, consequently,
significantly increased whenever the defender wants to combat
it by increasing the watermark power . In addition, the host
signal contributes itself to enforce the jitter effect through
in (13). Then, attributing the hole distortion to the jitter noise
and using (13), the optimal jitter square deviation
must satisfy . The optimum de-
fense, again, corresponds to .
3) Discussion: Results following from the analysis are sum-
marized below.
1) Facing AWGN attacks, increasing the watermark power
is always positive from the embedder’s point of view.
2) Under constant scaling attacks, the following two contra-
dicting effects related to deliberately increasing the wa-
termark power appear:
a) a positive effect: increasing the watermark power re-
sults in a more reliable detection;
b) a negative effect: increasing the watermark power en-
forces the desynchronization attack.
3) From the optimized defense analysis, one can see that
even in the worst case, that is “the mixed attack,”
increasing the watermark power remains optimal. Ex-
pressed differently, the so-called positive effect always
overcomes the negative effect under constant time shift
attacks.
4) The multicorrelation test alleviates the impact of the
(all-desynchronization) attack (optimum when no coun-
termeasure is taken).
5) Even if the random jitter behavior is noise-like, its depen-
dency on both the host signal and the watermark makes it
optimal from an attacker’s point of view.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first investigated the general watermarking
channel . Our main motivation was to evaluate the perceived
impact an attacker has on a watermarked signal. Our approach
consists in removing from the equivalent additive signal
, very often assumed to be uncorrelated with the water-
marked signal , the part that is signal-like. The equivalent at-
tack turns to be a particular case of well-studied channel attack:
attacks by filtering and additive noise. This additive noise re-
ferred to as the desynchronization noise has been shown to more
accurately characterize the attack impact on the original water-
marked signal quality loss. Our approach has then been applied
to the desynchronization attacks modeled by attacks by jitter
plus noise, the AWGN&J channel. Performance loss of the most
common watermarking schemes in the presence of such attacks
have then been derived. Finally, we investigated optimal attacker
and defender strategies in a watermarking game theory context.
Results outline a somewhat intuitive result: Desynchronization
attacks are much more harmful than additive noise. This was
the motivation for providing means to the defender to limit this
contribution. Finally, the best strategies for the defender and at-
tacker were described.
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